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Abstract
CHAracterization of Relevant Attributes using Cyber
Trajectory Similarities
Jordan Bean
Supervising Professor: Dr. Shanchieh Jay Yang
On secure networks, even sophisticated cyber hackers must perform multiple steps to
implement attacks on sensitive data and critical servers hidden behind layers of firewalls.
Therefore, there is a need to study these attacks at a higher multi-stage level. Traditional
taxonomy of cyber attacks focuses on analyzing the final stage and overall effects of an
attack but, not the characteristics of an attack movement or ‘trajectory’ on a network. This
work proposes to investigate trajectory similarities between multi-stage attacks, allowing
for the characterization of both a hacker’s behavior and vulnerable attack paths within a
network.
Currently, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) report alerts to a network analyst when
a malicious activity is suspected to have occurred on a network. Previous work in this
field has used IDS alerts as evidence of multi-stage attacks, and has thus been able to
group correlated alerts into cyber attack tracks. The main contribution of this work is to
use a revised Longest Common Subsequence(LCS) algorithm to analyze attack tracks as
trajectories. This allows a systematic analysis to determine which alert attributes within
a track are of great value to the characterization of multi-stage attacks. The basic LCS
vi
algorithm, which looks for the longest common sequence in two strings of data, is extended
to support the non-uniformity of alert data using a time windowing system. In addition, a
normalization method will be applied to ensure that the attack track similarity measure is
not adversely affected by differences in attack track length. By applying the revised LCS
algorithm, attack trajectories defined in terms of various IDS alert attributes are analyzed.
The results provide strong indicators of how multidimensional cyber attack trajectories can
be used to differentiate attack tracks.
vii
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This work seeks to develop a methodology that extracts similarities between cyber attack
movements within a network. These movements, also referred to as ’trajectories’ or ’tracks’
in the literature and this thesis, may be defined in terms of various attributes reported in
intrusion alerts. Our study suggests the use of Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) to
determine similarities between attack trajectories and adapts an entropy metric to evaluate
the importance of individual alert attributes. The results of this thesis should provide a
better knowledge base for a robust cyber attack track classification system as well as for a
cyber alert prediction systems.
1.1 Motivation
Modern networks that contain large amounts of important and often confidential or sensi-
tive information are generally kept on secure networks that use multiple layers of protection
against cyber hackers. As a result, hackers must use sophistocated attacks that require many
steps in order to infiltrate these multi-layer networks. The use of a multi-layered network
approach is common because it allows for restrictions to be placed on traffic that flows
into different portions of the network, especially those which are further away from direct
Internet access [2]. This configuration allows for a much more secure network where more
2
sensitive data can be hidden deeper in a more protected location of the network.
As the Internet and cyber hacking become increasingly prevalent, the methods with
which intruders are able to execute cyber attacks also become increasingly sophisticated.
Moreover, many methods used by knowledgeable hackers are now being published as
scripts that can be run by less experienced hackers [12]. This contributes directly to an
increase in the number of sophisticated attacks that regularly occur on complex networks.
Consequently, a mechanism which can recognize similarities among attacks that contain
multiple steps would be directly suited towards this portion of the cyber security problem.
Hansman and Hunt [12] identify multiple categories of attacks that can occur on a
network including; viruses, worms, buffer overflows, denial of service attacks, network
attacks, physical attacks, password attacks, and information gathering attacks. This is one
of the first works which classifies attacks based on the entire multiple step process that an
attack takes over a period of time [12]. Furthermore, Hansman and Hunt stated that their
solution aimed to create a classification which is not too general to be useful [12]. This is
a common problem that many classification systems which study attacks at the multistep
level suffer from. In the conclusion of their work, Hansman and Hunt determined that a
method able to correlate attacks that contain multiple dimensions of data would be of great
use [12]. Additionally, they concluded that an increased knowledge base in terms of multi-
stage attacks would provide essential knowledge for the proper and complete satisfaction
of all classification requirements [12]. The work done in this thesis will examine these
challenges.
3
1.2 Multi-Stage Cyber Attack Tracks
The production of alerts by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) generally results in large
data sets which quickly become unmanageable by a network analyst. For this reason, much
work has been done in the way of alert correlation techniques [5]. As a result of the work
done in [5] the notion of a multi-stage cyber attack track was created. In an attempt to re-
duce the complexity with which alert data is presented, alert correlation arranges IDS alerts
into time ordered sequences. Each sequence represents a group of alerts that is suspected
to have been generated by the actions of one or multiple hackers working together to reach
a single goal. As an inherent result of the manner in which attacks are both performed by
hackers and reported by IDS, the resulting attack tracks contain data that is non-uniformly
spaced in time. In the sections that follow the ideas of alert correlation and non-uniform
alert spacing will be discussed more thoroughly.
1.2.1 Alert Correlation
Fava et al. indicate that many different methods are currently used to perform alert correla-
tion [5]. These methods include; probabilistic correlation [30], behavior based correlation
[5], triggered event correlation [31], combinations of these events as well as others [5].
A completely probabilistic approach to alert correlation is presented by Valdes and
Skinner in [30]. Valdes and Skinner present a two sensor system in which they are able to
monitor misuse of TCP and then perform correlation based on Bayesian Statistics [30].
A second method proposed by Xu and Ning focuses on using what are called triggering
events to perform correlation of IDS alerts [31]. Xu and Ning first perform a grouping
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based on similar low level events that trigger the production of IDS alerts. Then using a
clustering algorithm, the alerts are separated into clusters which are expected to represent
alerts that are generated from the same attack [31].
1.2.2 Non-Uniform Alert Spacings
Throughout the process of alert generation, reporting and correlation, various factors lead
to a spacing of alert data that is non-uniform over time. Non-uniformity over time means
that intrusion alerts will occur at random points throughout the time scale instead of at
predetermined intervals. As will become clear later on, this is a very important concept
with respect to the comparison of two trajectories, espicially in terms of lining trajectories
up on the same time scale. Additionally, the use of different tactics by cyber hackers over
time will generally result in cyber alerts that are spaced in a non-uniform manner. In work
done by Dain and Cunningham in [8] they present alert data gathered from a cyber alert
competition at DEF CON. The alert data gathered over multiple correlated attacks shows a
clearly non-uniform pattern.
1.2.3 Alert Attributes
At each alert in an attack track, the following alert attributes exist; date and time of report,
exploited service, protocol used, source IP address, destination IP address, source port, des-
tination port, and alert severity. As a result of the characteristics and common uses of each
of these attributes, only a certain set was focused on for this thesis. The source IP address
was ignored in this case because techniques like IP spoofing, where a hacker’s source IP
address is faked, are fairly common [14]. Because this is commonly used among cyber
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hackers to conceal their identities, it proves to be a fairly unreliable measure of a hacker’s
action and could lead to misleading results and conclusions. Additionally, the source and
destination ports are also ignored for this thesis. Because the service alert attribute provides
more information than the destination port, it is not worthwhile to consider this attribute
[14]. For reasons similar to that of the source IP address, the source port can be an unreli-
able measure and is consequently ignored. An overview of alert attributes and their use is
given in Table 1.1.
Attribute Used Details
Severity Yes Provides a measure of an alerts severity or impact
DateTime Yes Provides time ordered reference
Service Exploited Yes Provides information regarding hacker’s interest
Destination IP Address Yes Provides locality characteristic
Source IP Address No Unreliable and/or misleading
Source Port No Unreliable
Destination Port No Covered in more detail by service attribute
Table 1.1: Alert attribute overview
As a result of the categorical nature of alert attributes, there is a direct need for a way
to map attributes to a ranked value for comparison. The method used to map categorical
alert attributes to ranked numerical values was based on the characteristics of each alert
attribute. Furthermore, this ranking is highly dependent on the possible categorical values
that each attribute can take on. Many of the alert attributes that are examined are mapped
to numerical values based on the criticality with which their categories can be associated.
This notion of mapping attribute categories based on criticality or threat level is an idea that
was proposed and used in Argauer’s thesis [2]. Additionally, it should be noted that by no
means do these mappings represent the only possible method of assigning numerical values
to the categorical alert attributes found in cyber data. Moreover, many different, yet logical
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and acceptable alert attribute mappings could be used to assign numerical values to the
various categories presented. The mappings used in this thesis represent the best possible
assignments that could be made based on the author’s current knowledge and available
resources. A complete and more detailed description of the mapping of each of the alert
attributes is given in the methodology section that follows.
1.3 Overview and Thesis Goals
This thesis plans to treat attack tracks as trajectories that occur in a multi-dimensional
Euclidian space. In this notion of attack trajectories, alert attributes will be mapped to
ranked values which can be used to plot an attack track in a Euclidian space. A visual
representation of an attack track as a trajectory, which uses three alert attributes to define
Euclidian dimensions is depicted below in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: A visual representation of an attack track as a 3-dimensional trajectory
In terms of this representation, the Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) method was
found to provide the best overall ability to match similar trajectories. Additionally, the
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LCS method was adapted to handle data sequences that are not uniformly spaced in time,
data sequences that are stretched out in time, and to provide some level of noise reduction.
Moreover, the abilities of the LCS algorithm will be used to find all possible cases of sim-
ilarity that may exist between two trajectories. The LCS method will be used to analyze
multiple cyber attack scenarios to generate a similarity matrix. The entropy of each alert
attribute will then be calculated using the similarity matrix values. This measure of entropy
will be used to determine which alert attributes contain the most interesting data and which
contain the least interesting data. A major advantage of this method of discovery is that
no preconceived notion of which attack tracks are similar has to be developed. The results
should indicate which alert attributes are the most important and give the most reliable
information when considering analysis of attack tracks. Overall, this will improve knowl-
edge of attack track characteristics and could provide a more concrete basis for further alert
prediction methods.
1.3.1 Alert Attribute Analysis
Because attack tracks are a relatively new concept, there is a need to determine their most
important properties in terms of cyber hacker analysis. The overall goal of this work is to
determine the most important and meaningful alert attributes that should be taken into ac-
count when performing attack track analysis. This will be accomplished using an algorithm
which examines two attack tracks and determines how similar they are with respect to each
other. The similarity of two attack tracks will be computed by comparing the values of
one alert attribute throughout the two tracks. This similarity value will then be used in the
calculation of the entropy value which will aid in the determination of the most important
8
alert attributes.
1.3.2 Matching of Time Stretched Attack Tracks
One of the main contributing factors to the spacing of IDS alert data in a non-uniform fash-
ion over time is the fact that many hackers and many attacks are performed over varying
periods of time. Attacks that occur over a period of time that is stretched out in compar-
ison to other attacks fall into a special subset of non-uniform data sequences that can be
classified as time stretched attacks. A study performed by Moitra and Konda in [24] exam-
ines data from CERT at the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute of attacks on
various websites. One attribute that the study examines is the time between web attacks or
incidents. Through this study Moitra and Konda found that attacks occur over periods of
time as along as many days or as short as within a single day [24]. This thesis will address
the problem of detecting similarities among stretched out time sequences by examining
different data sequence comparison methods to determine which can best tackle this issue.
1.3.3 Increased Knowledge Basis for Prediction Using Multiple Alert Attributes
The overall importance of this work is laying a foundation for improvement in future works.
In particular, one area that should benefit greatly from an increased knowledge of cyber at-
tack track characteristics is the field of alert prediction. By determining which attributes
best define the characteristics of an attack track, prediction methods should have a more
complete basis for their work and can hopefully increase prediction accuracy. Many meth-





For this thesis the main analysis method chosen was that of subsequence matching. Since
attack tracks are essentially time ordered sequences of data, subsequence matching methods
are a very attractive analysis option. Wu et al. conclude that the use of subsequence match-
ing techniques on data that occur in the form of time series can lead to important insight in
regards to the overall cyber attack problem domain [11]. Furthermore, Wu et al. state that
subsequence similarity matching can be used to improve the areas of prediction and rule
discovery by providing insight into the structure of time series data [11]. Many areas out-
side of the cyber domain have used subsequence matching for the purpose of performing
analysis on time series data including; analysis of the stock market, weather forecasts and
predictions, process workloads, budget predictions, as well as other applications [11]. The
application of a subsequence matching method to the cyber domain, particularly the field
of attack track analysis, should provide much greater insight into the overall structure and
characteristics of cyber attacks.
10
2.1 Similarity Comparison with Subsequence Matching Algorithms
2.1.1 Euclidian Distance
The standard Euclidian Distance algorithm is used to find the straight line distance between
two points in a Euclidian space and is defined in the equation given below [3].
D(A,B) = [(axn − bxn)2 + (ayn − byn)2]
1
2 (2.1)
By simply taking the average of the Euclidian distance between all points in two tra-
jectories or sequences of data, a measure of their similarity can be obtained. This is repre-






[(axn − bxn)2 + (ayn − byn)2]
1
2 (2.2)
This idea of performing a point wise comparison is a central concept to many similarity
comparison methods. Because of its relative simplicity, this measurement of similarity by
itself does not represent the best cyber attack trajectory comparison method.
2.1.2 Principle Components Analysis Using Euclidian Distance
A second measure of similarity studied by Zhange et al. in [32] was a combination of
Principle Components Analysis (PCA) and Euclidian Distance measurement that was de-
veloped by Bashir et al. in [9]. The work done by Bashir et al. was designed for application
in trajectories found in video data. Preprocessing of video data was done using a Karhunen-
Loeve Transform (KLT) for the compression of a 1-Dimensional signal representation of
video data trajectories [9]. Noise reduction was then performed on the resulting signal
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using a wavelet transform called DB4 [9]. Using coefficients derived from the wavelet
transform, a matrix is formed that represents the trajectory data. Single Value Decompo-
sition (SVD) is then applied to obtain the principle trajectory components [9]. By using
the Euclidian Distance, a measure of distance between the PCA components of the two
trajectories was found. Let the values EAm and EBm represent the distance measure of the
mth component of trajectories A and B respectively and the similarity value was calculated









The use of the Hausdorf distance as a measure of similarity was also considered in [32].
This distance measure is calculated using the following set of equations [17]
Dc = minA,B{DA,B, DB,A} (2.4)
DA,B = maxi=0...t{minj=0...T (di,j)}
DB,A = maxi=0...T{minj=0...t(di,j)}
where A and B are two trajectories being compared for similarity and di,j is the Euclidian
distance measure between points i and j on two different trajectories. A similarity metric
was then computed by calculating the difference in the speed of the points on one trajectory
with the speed of the points on a second trajectory [17].
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2.1.4 Hidden Markov Model-based Distance
In work done by Porikli et al. a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) based approach is used
to examine the various features used in the processing of video data [26]. Porikli et al.
used the notion of trajectories in video data to represent the various movements of objects
throughout the course of a video [26]. Similar to the manner in which the alert attributes are
used to make up attack track trajectories, Porikli used the properties of movement during
the course of a video to define the various features that make up video data trajectories [26].
The features used to define video trajectories in [26] were; speed, orientation, location,
size, and aspect ratio. These features play an important role in the detection of similarities
among video data trajectories. Porikli et al. first define a similarity measurement between
two objects j and k using Equation (2.5) given below.
mjk = e
−d(j,k)/2σ2 (2.5)
where d(j, k) is a measure of distance and σ2 is used as a constant scaling value [26]. The
distance measure is calculated using a likelihood function and the HMM representation of
the trajectories being compared. The resulting distance measure for two trajectories T a and
T b is formally presented below in Equation (2.6) [26].
d(T a, T b) =| L(T a;λa) + L(T b;λb)− L(T a;λb)− L(T b;λa) | (2.6)
where λa and λb are the HMMs of trajectories a and b respectively and L() represents a
likelihood function [26]. Using this similarity measure, Porikli et al. were able to create an
13
affinity matrix Mjk which represents the similarity of each of the objects j and k [26].
2.1.5 Dynamic Time Warping
The Dynamic Time Warping(DTW) algorithm is based on the idea that when comparing
two sequences of time series data that they must be aligned appropriately first [19]. More-
over, this algorithm performs a warping, a stretched mapping, from data points on one
sequence to data points on a second sequence. However, the use of DTW can result in
many points in one sequence being mapped to a single point in another sequence. This
singluarity problem develops an unexpected and undesired result in the alignment of two
data sequences [19].
Consider the following data sequences
A = a1, a2, ...an (2.7)
B = b1, b2, ...bm (2.8)
where data sequence A is of length n and data sequence B is of length m. A matirx
of size n-by-m that holds the distance between every possible set of points in the two
sequences, A and B, is then constructed. In General, the Euclidian distance is used for
this measurement. The similarity of two data sequences is then calculated by finding the
continuous path from one corner of the matrix to the opposite corner of the matrix that
minimizes the total cost[19]. This is referred to as finding the warping path that minimizes
the overall warping cost[19]. The minimal warping cost is calculated as
14





where wk is the kth element in the warping path, and K is a compensation factor used to
account for sequences of different lengths [19] [32].
Keogh and Pazzani in [19], give the equation for finding the warping path as
γ(i, j) = d(ai, bj) +min{γ(i− 1, j − 1), γ(i− 1, j), γ(i, j − 1)} (2.10)
where γ(i, j) is the cumulative distance. This cumulative distance is defined as the distance
of the current cell plus the minimum cumulative distance of the adjacent cells [19].
2.1.6 Longest Common Subsequence
The standard LCS algorithm looks for consecutive similarities in two sequences of data
starting at one end and moving to the other. Let T1 and T2 be attack tracks as defined by
the simulation data where i and j are the size of attack tracks T1 and T2 respectively. The
alerts in each track, T1 and T2, can be defined as a1, a2, ...ai and b1, b2, ...bj . The LCS
algorithm can thus be defined in a recursive fashion [23] as
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LCS(T1[i], T2[j]) =
0 if i = 0 of j = 0
1 + LCS(T1[i− 1], T2[j − 1]) if i,j > 0 and ai = aj
max(LCS(T1[i− 1], T2[j]), LCS(T1[i], T2[j − 1])) Otherwise
(2.11)
The result of a comparison between two attack tracks, T1 and T2, is the largest number
of consecutive points with the same value. For example let an attack track T1 be of length
m, then the result of LCS(T1, T1) will be the value m. Similarly, let an attack track T2 be
of length n, where n < m, then the result of LCS( T2, T2) will be the value n. This creates
an obvious problem in that the similarity value resulting from the two LCS comparisons
shows that T1 has a higher similarity value with itself than T2 has with itself. To provide
a better metric for comparison a normalization method was introduced. The calculation of





In the normalization equation, |T| represents the number of alerts in an attack track. All
of the resulting similarity values will fall within the range of [0.0,1.0]. Using this notion
of similarity, the results of the two comparison examples, LCS(T1, T1) and LCS(T2, T2),
will be of equal value.
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2.2 An Alternative to Using Similarity value for Trajectory Charac-
terization
In the work presented by Kholgade [20] a two-dimensional shape context algorithm is
extended to incorporate characterization of an object’s speed and direction of motion. The
motion classification presented by Kholgade relies on an initial shape context analysis.
This method extends the idea of a two-dimensional shape context to a third and fourth
dimension defined by an object’s speed and direction of motion [20]. Kortgen et al. in [22]
define a method that uses binned histograms to create a two-dimensional shape context.
The two-dimensional model used to explain this shape context notion consists of three
parts (Figure 2.1); a shell binning model, a sector binning model and a combined shell and
sector binning model [20, 22].
Figure 2.1: From left to right; shell binning with 4 shells, sector binning with 8 sectors, and com-
bined binning with 32 bins
In this notion, the shell binning model is used to define a single dimension (e.g. the
x-dimension), the sector binning model is used to define a second dimension (e.g. the y-
dimension), and the combined binning model is used to provide an overall shape context.
In [20], Kholgade introduces the idea of extending this shape context model to take an
object’s motion attributes into account. Kholgade’s model includes an object’s speed as a
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third dimension in the shape context model and an object’s direction of motion as a fourth
dimension. Using this enhanced model Kholgade is able to provide not only shape context
but, an object’s characterization through motion context as well.
2.3 Capabilities and Limitations of Subsequence Matching and Shape
Context Descriptors
Much of the work studied by Zhang et al. is aimed specifically at the application of process-
ing video surveilliance data [32]. The major overall conclusion that Zhang et al. realized
was that all of the methods other than DTW and LCS are generally fitted to working on
problems that examine differences in position similarity. Zhang et al. discovered that al-
though the Euclidian Distance measure and the PCA combined with Euclidian Distance
measure were significantly faster at processing data than the LCS and DTW methods, they
were less accurate overall [32]. Moreover, it was discovered that the Euclidian Distance
and PCA combined with Euclidian Distance measure suffered more easily from noise that
occurred in the time dimension [32]. However, overall Zhang et al. determined that the
DTW and LCS methods were better suited towards performing matching that focuses on
shape similarity and not the position based similarities that they were looking for in video
surveillance data [32]. Furthermore, they found the HMM and Hasudorf distance measures
to be poor in many aspects examined and thus not very useful for similarity detection in
trajectories. The HMM model was found to have a problem with over fitting of models as
a result of the small training set that is available [32]. The Hasudorf distance was found to
have trouble recognizing the difference between two trajectories as a result of the pair wise
point comparison method that it uses [32].
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2.4 Advantages of Longest Common Subsequence
Huang et al. [32] analyzed multiple sequence comparison methods for finding similarities
in data sequences. Based on their results, they concluded that LCS is best suited for finding
any possibly shape similarity that could occur in sequences of data. A major reason for this
is the ability of LCS to line trajectories up appropriately and to be able to handle noise that
occurs in the time dimension [32]. This second ability is extremely important considering
the non-uniform nature of the cyber alert trajectory data. In terms of the cyber attack track
application domain, this is an advantage. This is a direct result of being able to visualize
cyber attack tracks as trajectories in free space, where the shape of each trajectory is defined
by its alert attributes. Considering this characterization the search for shape similarity in
trajectories is directly applicable to the problem of finding similar cyber attack tracks.
Additionally, the new trend in which novice hackers use published scripts to employ
sophisticated attacks has become increasingly more common. However, these types of
attacks may be recognized quite easily by the LCS method due to the fact that use of the
same script by a hacker should generate similar resulting IDS alert sequences. This should
prove to be a great advantage of the LCS method over many of the other currently existing
methods.
2.4.1 Noise Reduction
Although Huang et al. [32] claim that both DTW and LCS work best on problems that
look for similarity of trajectory position or shape, Gunopulos et al. [23] claim that LCS
has an advantage over the DTW method in terms of noise rejection. This is due in large
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part to the fact that DTW requires all the elements in a sequence including the outliers to
be matched, while the LCS method allows for some mismatch of data points [23]. This is
an important issue because cyber attack tracks may have inherent missing or noisy data due
to correlation error or sophisticated and stealthy attacks. An alert provides a snapshot or a
single piece of evidence within an entire attack track. IDS are not guaranteed to capture all
of the possible alerts that occur during a multi-stage attack and therefore, the possibility of
missing alerts must be taken into account. Additionally, normal network communication
and advanced cyber hacking methods can create alerts that are unrelated to any end goal
which, can in turn create noise in an attack track.
2.4.2 Handling of Time Stretched Attack Tracks
Due to the details of its implementation, the LCS method is able to detect similarities
among attack tracks that are stretched out over different periods of time. An example of
a comparison involving a time stretched attack is shown in Figure 2.2 where only two
dimensions, time and attack severity are being considered.
As can be seen in Figure 2.2 attack Trajectory 1 and attack Trajectory 2 contain the
exact same progression of attack severity only over a very different time scale. Due to the
nature of even the basic LCS algorithm, these to trajectories will be detected as exactly the
same.
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As a result of its many advantages in terms of the cyber attack application domain, the
Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) method was used for similarity detection in this
thesis [23]. Furthermore, the similarity measure provided by the LCS method was used in
conjunction with a measure of entropy to accomplish the reduction of cyber attack track
data dimensionality [21]. The combination of these two methods ensures that attack track
progression as a trajectory is taken into account during the discovery of the important of
alert attributes.
3.1 Mapping of Alert Attributes
3.1.1 Alert Severity
The notion of a severity attribute in a cyber alert was developed by Argauer in [2] for the
purpose of associating a specific exposure level with alerts. This exposure assignment is
performed using the Virtual Terrain Assisted Impact Assessment for Cyber Attack Tracks
(VTAC) processing that is completed during the correlation of alerts into attack tracks. In
Argauer’s thesis, a damage score is assigned to each exposure as a measure of the severity
that may result [2]. Additionally, gaps were left between the different mapped values to
account for differences in privilege levels [2]. The damage scores that Argauer developed
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are given in table 3.1 below.







Table 3.1: Damage scores assigned to exposures
In order to accommodate an increasingly detailed list of exposures, the severity at-
tributes and damage scores associated with them was expanded. The expanded categories
and their associated damage scores are given in Table 3.2.
In this instance the basic rule of thumb was followed in which categories with a higher
threat level or criticality were mapped to higher numerical values. The mappings performed
for the expanded list of severity categories was originally developed by Haitao Du 1 and
then later verified by Jared Holsopple a known expert on the subject.
3.1.2 Destination IP Address
For this thesis the destination IP address was used as a characterization of a hacker’s move-
ment throughout a network. Accordingly, a simulation network was divided up into its
individual subnets for similarity comparison. This is a direct application of the work done
in [2] where a layered network approach was used to differentiate between parts of a net-
work that were configured in different manners. Moreover, this division of a simulation
network into zones allows a hacker’s movement throughout a network to be used for the
purpose of characterization based on the different network layers that have been accessed.
1Conversation with Haitao Du, Network and Information Processing lab.
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Table 3.2: Damage scores assigned to expanded exposures
The simulation network created and the corresponding network zones are presented in Fig-
ure 3.1.
3.1.3 Services Attacked
The network services attribute represents the services that are exploited throughout an at-
tack by a cyber hacker. The exploitation of network services throughout the course of an
attack track will be monitored using a modified histogram to keep track of which services
are attacked most often. The modified histogram consists of five groups or five separate
24
Figure 3.1: Network Zones
histograms. The original five groups are organized into different levels of relative impor-
tance. A factor of sensitivity was also built in to allow for the promotion or relegation of
services to the group above or below respectively. This would occur when a service resides
at the top or the bottom of a histogram for an extended period of time. The affects of this
promotion and relegation scheme were left for examination in future work and were not
studied in depth for this thesis. The network service histogram groupings for this thesis
were arranged in the fashion presented in Table 3.3. Detailed mappings are not given in the
table because assignments are performed dynamically at run time.
The groupings presented in Table 3.3 were developed using the same basic rule which
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uses a measure of criticality as a mapping guide. In this instance, the services were entered
into groups based on criticality. Using background information from [1], [18], [7], [28],
[10], [13], [16], [27], [29], [33] the overall determination for each of the original groupings
was made. Additionally, data from work done by Argauer was used to support these resul-
tant groupings [2]. For example, Argauer noted that both the services FTP and DNS had
relatively high impacts associated with their being compromised and so they were placed
in group 2 to reflect their relatively similar criticalities. Furthermore, research on these two
services and prior knowledge of the importance of these services led to the verification that
group 2 was an acceptable place for these particular services to reside. It should be noted
again that the groupings formed here are somewhat representative of opinion and are most
certainly subject to interpretation. Multiple groupings that are each justifiable in their own
right are certainly more than possible and in some cases may be the result of a network’s
setup, especially in real world applications.
The actual mapped values were determined by keeping a histogram of which services
were attacked most often. The actual number of times that a service was attacked was
then used to compute the corresponding percentage of attacks that occur on that service in
its particular group. For example, if in group 3 ICMP, IIS, and IMAP were all attacked
4 times and FPSE and LotusServer were attack 6 times then the resulting percentages for
each of ICMP, IIS and IMAP would be around 16.7% and for FPSE and LotusServer the
percentages would be 25%. This percentage was then multiplied by 10 and then the lowest
possible base value in the corresponding group was added to the result to complete each
service mapping. In the previously given example, the ICMP,IIS, and IMAP services would
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all result in a value of approximately 21.7 calculated using the expression (10 ∗ 16.7) +
20 = 21.7. In this manner, each service was mapped to a numerical value within its own
predefined group.
3.1.4 Protocol
The protocol attribute of a cyber alert was compared in a categorical fashion. Moreover,
the protocol categories were only noted as being similar if the two categorical values were
exactly the same. Because there is only a small number of protocols that are used for
transmission over the internet, and because there is very little evidence to suggest major
vulnerability or exposure differences between the protocols they will most likely be kept as
categorical values for this thesis.
3.2 Adaptation and Enhancement of the Longest Common Subsequence
Method
3.2.1 Alert Non-Uniformity and Time Windowing
Due to the non-uniform nature of the attack track alert data, some enhancements were
required in order to make the LCS algorithm work as desired. A major overall goal of these
enhancements was to ensure that any possible similarities that exist between trajectories is
found. Moreover, these adjustments were made to the basic LCS algorithm to provide a
solution that was better suited to the detection of attack trajectory similarity. To increase
the effectiveness of the LCS comparison method, the alert data was first normalized in time.
Normalization was accomplished by setting the first alert in an attack track to time zero and
then using the time stamp attribute to appropriately shift the following alerts to maintain
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the correct time distance between alerts. Furthermore, a matching threshold was added to
the basic LCS algorithm in place of the requirement for an exact match when performing
comparison of alert attribute values. In essence, the basic LCS algorithm was changed to
the form presented in Equation (3.1) where α represents the matching threshold [23].
LCSα(T1[i], T2[j]) =
0 if i = 0 of j = 0
1 + LCSα(T1[i− 1], T2[j − 1]) if i,j > 0 and abs( ai - aj ) > α
max(LCSα(T1[i− 1], T2[j]), LCSα(T1[i], T2[j − 1])) Otherwise
(3.1)
The inherently non-uniform alert data was handled by implementing a time window-
ing system. When a comparison resulting in a difference value outside of the matching
threshold is encountered, the time windowing system will be invoked. The time window-
ing system allows the point that is latest in time to remain as a fixed comparison point
while the second comparison point is updated to a later point in time. This is illustrated by
examining the two attack tracks presented in figure 3.2.
(a) First comparison (b) Second comparison, time windowing invoked
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(c) Third comparison, time windowing continued (d) Fourth comparison, time windowing complete
Figure 3.2: A visual representation of an attack track as a 3-dimensional trajectory.
Let the points in track 1 be defined by data points a1, a2, ...ai and the points in track 2
be defined by data points b1, b2, ...bj . Let the result of the first comparison, between points
a1 and b1 fall within the matching threshold. The second comparison, between data points
a2 and b2 will result in a difference value that is not within the matching threshold. At this
point the time windowing system will take into account that data point b2 is later in time
than data point a2, and will perform a comparison of data points b2 and a3. Comparison of
data points b2 and a3 will also result in a difference value outside of the matching threshold.
Because data point b2 is still later in time than data point a3, the time windowing system
will take effect and the data points b2 and a4 will be compared. The comparison of these
two data points will result in a difference value that is within the matching threshold and
the LCS algorithm will continue.
3.2.2 Comparison Granularity
The factor α introduced in equation (3.1) is an adjustable parameter that can change the
granularity of each similarity comparison made in the LCS algorithm. In their work Vla-
chos et al. refer to this adjustable parameter as a matching threshold [23]. Adjustments
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were made to this parameter and the LCS algorithm was run over multiple data sets. The
results were then analyzed to examine the effect of changes in the granularity.
3.3 Determination of Important Alert Attributes and Entropy Calcu-
lation
The resulting analysis of each of the alert attribute dimensions using the LCS algorithm
provides measurements of similarity in the form of a similarity matrix. A sample similarity
matrix created using five trajectories is given below in Table 3.4.
This matrix consists of values ranging from 0.0, indicating no similarity between two
trajectories, to 1.0, indicating a completely matching set of trajectories. During the analysis
of similarity matrix data, the diagonal was ignored because it represents comparisons of
trajectories with themselves which, always match completely. Additionally, due to the
implementation specifics of LCS, the similarity matrix will be symmetric with respect to
the diagonal. Thus, only either the upper or lower triangular half of the matrix must be
considered during analysis of a single alert attribute. The actual numerical values that
occur within the similarity matrix for a single attribute indicate what percentage of two
trajectories match. In the example given in Table 3.4 Trajectory 3 and Trajectory 2 are
%60 similar to each other with respect to the shorter sequence. Later, it will be shown how
the variation of similarity values present in the lower triangular half of the matrix will be
used to determine the importance of the attribute represented. More specificaly, it will be
explained how the similarity percentages in the lower triangular half of the amtrix will be
used to compute an entropy value which can then be used to discern attribute importance.
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Determination of important alert attributes was accomplished using a measure of en-
tropy introduced by Dash et al. in [21]. In an experimental studty that they performed
Dash et al. used this measure of entropy as a replacement for Principle Components Anal-
ysis (PCA) for the purpose of discovering the most important dimensions in a data set [21].
Dash et al. found that use of the PCA algorithm required knoweldge of original features
which in some cases may not be possible. More specifically, during examination of certain
data sets, Dash et al. found that many factors including large data sets and no prior knowl-
edge of principle components contributes to a decrease in the effectiveness of PCA. As a
result, they determined that entropy could be used to determine the importance that a di-
mension held based on the similarities that occured between points within this dimension.






(Sij × log2(Sij) + (1− Sij)× log2(1− Sij)) (3.2)
where Sij is Dash et al.’s measure of similarity between two trajectories [21]. This measure
of similarity is defined where a value of 0.0 indicates pairs of trajectories that are very
similar and a value of 1.0 indicates pairs of trajectories that have little to no similarity [21].
Because this represents an inverse relationship to the similarity value given by the LCS
method, the values from this similarity matrix should be adjusted using the simple equation
Sij = 1 − Lsij , where Lsij represents LCS similarities. However, closer examination of
the entropy calculation shows that because both Sij and 1− Sij are used, the results of the
inverse similarity values should match those of the LCS similarities taken directly. It also
must be noted that since the entropy equation uses the base two logarithm, the similarity
31
values entered must be in between 1.0 and 0.0 not inclusive or (0.0, 1.0). Because the
LCS method allows for similarity values that are between 1.0 and 0.0 inclusive or [0.0,1.0]
simple heuristic measures had to be applied to values of 1.0 and 0.0. For LCS similarity






if Lsij = 0.0
n2
1+n2
if Lsij = 1.0
1− Lsij Otherwise
(3.3)
where n is the size of the shorter trajectory. The resulting entropy values were used to
determine which attributes contain the most interesting and important data. This thesis
defines the most important trajectories as those that are neither completely dissimilar or
completely the same. Dash et al. define the entropy to indicate that trajectory pairs are
either very close or very distant when the value of a single entropy calculation is close to
0.0 and that a pair of trajectories is close to the mean distance or mean similarity when the
value for a single entropy calculation is close to 1.0 [21]. As a result, the most interesting
data will be found in the attributes that have a higher overall entropy value over their entire
similarity matrix.
To obtain a better understanding of what this entropy value indicates about a corre-
sponding input data set, it was first graphed. The results of graphing the entropy equation
from (3.2) are shown below in Figure 3.3.
Examination of this graph quickly shows that any resulting low entropy values will be
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Figure 3.3: A graphical represntation of the output entropy based on a single input similarity value.
the product of a data set that contains trajectories that are almost entirely similar to each
other or trajectories that have extremely little similarity with each other. For example an
entropy value of below 4 would be obtained only when the input similarity value of two
trajectories was either below 0.08 (8% similar) or above 0.92 (92% similar) with respect
to each other. Furthermore, based on the entropy equation, it should be noted that it would
take an entire data set of very low and/or very high similarity values to produce a low
entropy value for an entire similarity matrix.
As was previously discussed, the level of importance of trajectories can be determined
by the amount of similarity between them. Many trajectories have great importance how-
ever, those trajectories which are complete matches or complete non-matches are of little
interest. Revisiting Figure 3.3, it can be seen that only the trajectories which have complete
matches or very high similarities and the trajectories that don’t match at all or have very
low similarities will result in low entropy values. Since this is exactly what is desired based
on the relationship between similarity and importance, this measure of entropy provides a
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Table 3.3: Grouping of Services Histograms
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T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
T1 1.0 0.25 0.3 0.2 0.8
T2 0.25 1.0 0.6 0.75 0.4
T3 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.5
T4 0.2 0.75 0.5 1.0 0.0
T5 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0





The data used throughout this paper was generated using a network simulation tool created
by Costantini et al. [4]. This simulation tool was used to create a computer network based
largely on the layered network approach introduced by Argauer in [2]. This approach is
centered on the idea that data flowing into the network, in the direction away from the
internet, should have limitations while the data that is heading out towards the internet can
flow freely [2]. Additionally, the information flowing out of the given network should not
be allowed to access the servers that are setup in what Argauer defines as a demilitarized
zone that is directly connected to the internet [2]. The network developed for this work is
shown above in Figure 3.1.
In this simulation network, various zones were established using the subnet addresses as
a separation criterion. Zone 1 houses the servers that are directly connected to the internet
and thus makeup the demilitarized section of the network, as was defined in Argauer’s
layered network approach. Zone 2 houses internal servers that should be accessible to the
users in zones 3 through 8 and can be thought of as a sort of intranet for these users [2].
The remaining zones makeup user occupied areas of the network that offer varying network
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services.
Data from a single attack from a run of the simulation on a developed network is shown
in Table 4.1.
Step Source IP Target IP (Port#) Service Exposure Description Effect
1 9.5.231.72 192.168.1.5 (#80) WEB-MISC Webtrends HTTP probe Discovered
2 252.10.175.172 192.168.1.5 (#80) WEB-IIS unicode directory traversal attempt Compromised
3 192.168.1.5 192.168.2.3 (#80) WEB-IIS postinfo.asp access Compromised
4 192.168.1.5 192.168.2.2 (#111) RPC mountd TCP exportall request Compromised
5 192.168.1.5 192.168.2.3 (#80) WEB-IIS cmd32.exe access Compromised
6 192.168.2.3 192.168.7.52 (#80) WEB-IIS cmd32.exe access Compromised
7 192.168.7.52 192.168.8.14 (#20) FTP RNFR ././ attempt Compromised
Table 4.1: An example 7-step cyber attack.
It should be noted that due to the form in which IDS sensors are arranged and report
data, that repeat IDS alerts are fairly common in many systems. For the purposes of this
work, the duplicate alerts have been removed to ensure a fair weighting and comparison
scheme.
The LCS algorithm was verified using multiple test cases developed with Costantini’s
simulator. This was accomplished with a manual attack generation capability that is avail-
able in the simulation tool [4]. Initially, trivial cases consisting of very similar or exactly
the same attacks were tested. Then cases in which little or no matching should result were
tested. After these trivial cases were verified as working correctly, more complex cases
involving the use of time stretched attacks and attacks containing largely different alert
spacings were tested. This effectively allowed for the verification of the time windowing
capabilities.
4.2 Similarity Results
The actual result of an LCS comparison, in similarity matrix form, is shown in Table 4.2.
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T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 T12 T13 T14 T15
T1 1.0 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.4
T2 0.6 1.0 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.4
T3 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.71 0.4 0.2 0.71 0.4 0.8 1.0
T4 1.0 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.4
T5 0.6 1.0 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.4
T6 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.71 0.4 0.2 0.71 0.4 0.8 1.0
T7 1.0 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.4 0.4
T8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
T9 0.6 0.4 0.71 0.6 0.6 0.71 0.6 0.2 1.0 0.6 0.2 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.71
T10 1.0 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.4 0.4
T11 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
T12 0.6 0.4 0.71 0.6 0.4 0.71 0.6 0.2 1.0 0.6 0.2 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.71
T13 1.0 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.4
T14 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.4
T15 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.71 0.4 0.2 0.71 0.4 0.4 1.0
Table 4.2: A similarity matrix for 15 attack tracks examined on the severity attribute.
As was previously noted in Section 3.3 the diagonal of the matrix shows the complete
matches resulting from the comparison of a trajectory to itself. Additionally, the similarity
values resulting from the LCS comparisons will be symmetric about the diagonal because
similarity comparisons are not order dependent. In essence, a comparison between trajec-
tories 4 and 6 will have the same similarity result as a comparison between trajectories 6
and 4. An analysis of a few selected attack tracks is broken down below with the aid of
visual representation, using the severity attribute.
The example depicted in Figure 4.1 shows a visual representation of the severity at-
tribute’s progression over time. This example reveals the validity and use of the LCS algo-
rithm to detect similarities in attacks that are stretched out in time. Examination of Table
4.2 shows that the comparison of trajectory 3 and trajectory 15 leads to a complete match.
This is because the two attacks follow the same severity progression over two different
periods of time.
The example depicted in Figure 4.2 shows how the time windowing functionality was
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Figure 4.1: Two trajectories that illustrate a basic similarity.
used to detect similarities in trajectories that may not be immediately obvious upon vi-
sual inspection. In this instance, a 60 percent similarity match is found between the two
trajectories as can be confirmed by examining Table 4.2. By simply realigning the exam-
ple presented in Figure 4.2 to look more like the trajectories presented in Figure 4.3 this
similarity can be more easily seen.
Using the trajectories in Figure 4.3 the resulting similarity value in Table 4.2 can be
explained. Starting at the point on trajectory 4 that is at approximately time 14, this point
can be matched to the point just above it on trajectory 2 that also occurs at approximately
time 14. Then the next two points to the right on both trajectories will also be successfully
matched. Through the use of the time windowing system, the point that is on trajectory 2
and occurs at approximately time 22 will be ignored as if it were noise. Then the final two
points on trajectories 2 and 4 will be matched, creating 3 positive matches over the course
of a minimum of 5 possibilities. Using the similarity measure from Equation (2.12) the
final similarity value will thus be calculated as 0.6.
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Figure 4.2: Two trajectories that illustrate a more complex similarity.
The last example, presented in Figure 4.4 illustrates two trajectories which have very
few similar steps. Thus, the resulting similarity value as shown in Table 4.2 is a very low
value of 0.2. Throughout all possible alignments of the two trajectories, no where do any
sequences greater than a single point match occur. Furthermore, trajectory 8 is composed
of 5 individual alerts, two of which occur very closely at approximately 8 seconds. Using
Equation (2.12) leads to a value of 0.2 for the two trajectories presented here.
Although the severity attribute is the only one presented here, the concepts that are
illustrated by these examples hold true for each of the other alert attributes examined.
4.3 The Relationship of Entropy Based on Trajectory Similarity
Recalling the similarity matrix shown in Table 4.2 the meaning of trajectory similarity
was explored further in regards to the role it plays in determining importance. Without
concrete examples and critical thinking simply applying the entropy value proposed by
Dash et al. gives only minor insight to reasons behind the approach taken in this thesis.
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Figure 4.3: Two trajectories, one of which has been realigned to more clearly show similarity.
An examination was performed with the focus of determining how the importance measure
or entropy value corresponded to the similarities contained within an attribute’s similarity
matrix. Furthermore, the resulting importance values were related back to the notion of
cyber trajectory data.
It can be said quite trivially that a similarity matrix contianing only the value 0.9 would
result in an attribute that is not interesting. In terms of cyber trajectories this indicates
a case where all the trajectories of a certain attribute can be classified into one group or
as one type of cyber trajectory. Since there is little that can be learned from a data set
containing trajectories that all belong to the same group, it can be said that an attribute with
this characteristic would be of little importance. A data set consisting of all 0.9 similarity
values would result in a corresponding entropy value of 0.4690.
In the opposite case, where a similarity matrix containing only values of 0.1 is consid-
ered, the result will be the same. Because no classifications or groping of trajectories can
be performed, based on the fact that there is no similarity between any of the trajectories
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Figure 4.4: Two trajectories that have a low similarity with each other.
present, then little knowledge can be gained from examining this data set. Therefore, the
attribute that this type of similarity matrix represents shows little importance. A data set
consisting of similarity values that were all 0.1 would result in an entropy value of 0.4690.
In a more complex manner, if a similarity matrix contains both the values 0.1 and 0.9
the result can still be used to classify an attribute as not important. This may seem contrary
to intuition because values of both 0.1 and 0.9 represent some type of variation in a data
set and therefore it may be desired to consider this interesting. However, consider a data
set that contains 10 trajectories in which Trajectories 1,2,3,4, and 5 are all similar to each
other with a value of 0.9 and the Trajectories 6,7,8,9, and 10 are all similar to each other
with a value of 0.9. Additionally, consider a situation in which the trajectories from the first
set are all similar to the trajectories from the second set with a value of 0.1 or %10 percent
similarity. In this case it would be said that all the trajectories that represent this attribute
can be strictly classified into one of two types. This by itself is not largely interesting.
On the contrary, in a case where data akin to that presented in Table 4.2 exists, there is
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a considerable variability that can be used to determine the level at which this attribute is
interesting. Since this data set contains trajectories with varying similarity values as shown
in the histogram in Figure 4.5, it can be seen that many different classifications can be
created.
Figure 4.5: A histogram showing the varying values of similarity in Table 4.2.
Examining Table 4.2 it can be said that since trajectory 14 has a %60 similarity with
trajectory 1 then these two trajectories could be classified as the same type of attack and
since trajectory 1 also has a %60 similarity with trajectory 12 the they could be included
in this same classification as well. However, it can also be seen that trajectories 12 and 14
have a similarity with each other of only %40 percent so maybe they shouldn’t be in the
same classification as each other. In this manner, many different groupings or classification
schemes can be validly created thus making the attribute represented by this corresponding
similarity matrix of great interest. The similarity matrix in Table 4.2 results in an entropy
value of 0.7736.
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These above cases give better overall intuition on why and under what context the en-
tropy measure proposed by Dash et al. is being applied to cyber trajectory data.
4.4 Granularity Analysis of Attributes
Each of the attributes used during this thesis was examined based on two different levels
of division. The resolution is the first type of division level examined. The resolution of an
attribute can be defined as the number of inherent separate categories that an attribute can
be divided up into. In the case of the severity attribute, this is limited to the extended list
of different categories presented in Table 3.2 and based on Argauer’s original categories
presented in [2]. The maximal resolution possible for the destination IP address attribute is
to compare attributes simply by specific addresses. In this thesis however, the destination
IP address will be analyzed at the subnet level. This is further explained in Section 3.1.2
and illustrated in Figure 3.1. The attribute services can have an extremely high resolution
since there is a multitude of network services offered for many systems. Furthermore, each
service attribute can be broken down into the different versions of that service that may
exist. For the purposes of this thesis the resolution presented in Table 3.3 was used. Lastly,
the protocol attribute is limited to the few network protocols that exist and are commonly
used. The inherent resolutions that were used for each of the attributes in this thesis were
discussed previously in Section 1.2.3.
The second level of division that exists for each of the attributes in this thesis is that of
the granularity factor, α presented in Equation (3.1). This factor of granularity is different
from the inherent resolution of each attribute in that it does not necessarily conform to the
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inherent groupings or levels that exist for each of the attributes. For example, setting the
granularity factor for the destination IP address attribute to a value of 10 is not the same just
dividing the destination IP address attribute up into its different inherent subnets. This is
constant for each of the different attributes presented except possibly the protocol attribute
which has no further groupings or divisions and is categorical by nature.
When selecting the optimal granularity value for each attribute, it is important to use a
value which is neither too big nor too small. If the granularity is too small singular compar-
isons will result in the set of matching points being too restricted and thus trajectories with
good similarities may not be matched. If the granularity value is too high then singular
comparisons will too easily result in a match and the resulting set of matching points will
be too inclusive. In this thesis the optimal granularity factor is found by analyzing multiple
random attack scenarios and then using the resulting entropies to determine which gran-
ularity values are the best. The entropy value here was determined using the previously
specified entropy Equation (3.1).
Using the network simulation tool developed by Costantini, a large number of random
attack trajectories was created. The LCS method was then used to obtain similarity matrices
for each attribute which, were in turn used to compute the overall entropy of each attribute.
The results are presented below in Table 4.3.
4.4.1 Alert Severity
The results in Table 4.3 show that the alert severity attribute has the highest entropy value
at a granularity of 2. Furthermore, the high alert severity entropy value of 0.8519 indicates
that this attribute does contain important trajectory information. It should also be noted that
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Destination IP
Granularity Severity Address Services Protocol
0 0.7874 0.7156 0.8206 0.5936
1 0.7874 0.5691 0.8674 0.4186
2 0.8519 0.4388 0.8726 0.2979
3 0.8519 0.3673 0.8766 0.2979
4 0.8457 0.3164 0.8789 0.2979
5 0.8457 0.2979 0.8783 0.2979
10 0.6814 0.2979 0.8180 0.2979
25 0.3502 0.2979 0.6618 0.2979
Table 4.3: Results of changing the granularity over a random assortment of attacks.
unlike the destination IP address attribute, the severity attribute does not have to follow a
specific path to any end goal. As a result, the alert severity trajectory may contain many
variations of sequences of the exposure damage scores discussed in 3.1.1. Recall that these
values were developed as an expansion to Argauer’s approach to assigning damage scores
to certain exposures in [2]. Moreover, these score values provide the basic resolution that
is used by the alert severity attribute throughout this thesis.
4.4.2 Destination IP Address/Subnet
The destination IP address, which is examined at the subnet level, has a maximal entropy
at a granularity of 0. Since attacks must follow a specific path on their way to many places
in the network, it is highly likely that there is a significant number of trajectories with
high subsequence similarities for this attribute. For example, an attack on Zone 4 of the
Network from Figure 3.1 would most likely be a subsequence of an attack on Zone 7. This
is because both attacks will have to go through the progression of attacking Zone 1, then
attacking Zone 2, and then attacking Zone 4. This idea in conjunction with the fact that
the maximum entropy value occurs at a granularity of 0 may suggest that the Destination
47
IP address attribute should be examined at a lower resolution. However, the next lowest
inherent resolution would occur at the individual address level. This would easily create
an attribute which is too divided and would thus be too restrictive during comparisons.
Additionally, using the granularity factor to compensate for this increased division would
be inappropriate as it would too easily allow for matches between alerts that occur in two
different subnets. Moreover, the resulting maximum entropy value presented in Table 4.3
is significantly high enough to say that this attribute is important at this level of resolution.
4.4.3 Services Attacked
The services attribute has an entropy value near the maximum for granularities between 1
and 5 with an overall maximum entropy occurring at a granularity of 4. This indicates that
the selected resolution for the services attribute provides an appropriate level of inherent
division. Recall that the inherent resolution for this attribute was selected by grouping
services with similar cyber properties and attack characteristics and is shown in Table 3.3
along with further discussion in Section 3.1.3.
In general, networks are setup to offer more than one service to a user, thus allowing
for a multitude of different overall paths for the service trajectory to take. However, in
some cases certain machines or groups of machines may be setup to offer only one or a
limited number of services. In this instance, the reduced set of possible services that can be
attacked essentially creates one path which a hacker must follow to obtain certain end goals
on a defined portion of a multi-level network. As a result, the services attribute would no
longer become useful in this type of network configuration because all of the attacks would




The protocol attribute suffers from the fact that there are only so many divisions which are
made thus giving a very restricted overall granularity. Due to the inherent nature of the
protocol attribute, it cannot be divided up into a finer grained resolution for examination.
This in general contributes to conclusion that the protocol attribute is of very little use for
this type of trajectory analysis.
4.5 Network Topology
As was discussed above, the importance of some alert attributes may be altered by changes
in an overall network configuration. One place in which this is highly notable is in the
setup of a network’s topology. In particular, it is expected that changes in the network
topology could have an adverse effect on the destination IP address/subnet attribute. An
examination of two network extremes, a network with a large breadth and a network with a
large depth, was performed. This breadth versus depth characteristic was examined using
the two networks presented in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. The two networks were setup to be the
same in all characteristics except for the network topology. Then the same attack vectors
were ran on each network over a wide range of granularities. The resulting entropies are
recorded in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5.
Examination of these results quickly shows that the subnet attribute suffers in the in-
creased depth network topology. This is reflected in the resulting low subnet attribute
entropy values for all the possible granularities shown in Table 4.5. This is a direct result
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Destination IP
Granularity Severity Address Services Protocol
0 0.7958 0.8706 0.8911 0.5439
1 0.7958 0.7753 0.8843 0.5439
2 0.8434 0.6528 0.8843 0.4690
4 0.8570 0.5303 0.8843 0.4690
10 0.7277 0.4690 0.8434 0.4690
25 0.4894 0.4690 0.8162 0.4690
Table 4.4: Random attacks over the increased breadth network.
Destination IP
Granularity Severity Address Services Protocol
0 0.7553 0.3568 0.6666 0.3531
1 0.7553 0.2754 0.6511 0.3531
2 0.7727 0.2754 0.6288 0.2754
4 0.7580 0.2754 0.6288 0.2754
10 0.7301 0.2754 0.6016 0.2754
25 0.3681 0.2754 0.4151 0.2754
Table 4.5: Random attacks over the increased depth network.
of the ease with which subnet trajectories can have matching sequences. Since every attack
on the increased depth network must move through the same subnets on their way to a final
goal, there will be a significantly high number of very similar subsequences. For this rea-
son, the subnet attribute becomes much less interesting and this is reflected in the reduced
entropy values that result.
Although similar results would be expected on the increased breadth network, where
it would be expected that very few trajectories followed the same path, the actual results
given in Table 4.4 show that an acceptable entropy value is obtained at a granularity of
zero. This result can be explained by the fact that a basic principle of the layered network
approach presented by Argauer is still maintained [2]. Using a set of servers connected
to the internet to help with control of network traffic forces attacks to go through this
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subnet and therefore creates at least some similarity in the resulting attack trajectories.
This means that some similarities in the subnet attribute will be inherent in the resulting
data and therefore, acceptable entropies will result.
Figure 4.6: Network with an increased breadth
On the contrary, the severity attribute should constantly be a useful attribute for the
characterization of a hackers movement on a network. This is because the severity attribute
is not as easily effected by changes in the network topology as the subnet or services
attributes. Over the many different attack scenarios that were run, the severity attribute
always had a value that was significantly high enough to distinguish it as an important
attribute as can be seen in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
4.6 Efficiency and Stealth Factor
The network simulation tool developed by Costantini in [4] includes adjustable parameters
that are used to mimic the different behavioral patterns that hackers may exhibit. The
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Figure 4.7: Network with an increased depth
parameters stealth and efficiency were varied during this thesis to create realistic attack
scenarios. The stealth parameter is used to set how directly a hacker can reach his end
goal [4]. A low stealth value (close or equal to 0.0) shows many or all of the intermediate
steps that a hacker has taken in order to reach a final goal [4]. A high stealth value (close
or equal to 1.0) represents an attack in which only a few intermediate steps or only the
final goal step is reported by the IDS [4]. Similarly, the efficiency parameter varies how
directly a resulting attack moves towards an end goal. An attack that is generated with
an efficiency value of 0.0 will choose many intermediate steps, including many steps that
could be misleading from an analysts standpoint [4]. This can be pictured as an attack that
52
branches out in many directions before reaching its final goal [4]. In contrast, an attack
with an efficiency factor of 1.0 will result in an attack that has very few or no branches and
each step represents a direct approach to the overall goal [4].
In order to further examine the effects of increased noise in attack scenarios and to
examine the merits of the implemented time windowing system, multiple random low ef-
ficiency and high stealth attacks were ran on a network. The resulting attack trajectories
generated should contain both a significant amount of noise as well as many unreported
steps. This will test the algorithm’s ability to handle noise and missing alerts. Additionally,
many different attack targets were chosen in order to create tracks of various lengths. The
resulting entropy value over a range of granularities is given in Table 4.6.
Destination IP
Granularity Severity Address Services Protocol
0 0.8392 0.8911 0.7816 0.5125
1 0.8392 0.8567 0.8086 0.2648
2 0.8662 0.5748 0.8433 0.1095
4 0.8926 0.2369 0.8701 0.1082
10 0.8049 0.1082 0.8708 0.1082
25 0.3290 0.1082 0.6131 0.1082
Table 4.6: Random attacks on a large network with low efficiency (0.1) and a high stealth (0.9).
The result of these attacks shows that the time windowing and time stretching detection
capabilities do indeed work well in cases where noise and missing alert data is present. This
shows that the usefulness of the time windowing system as well as the inherent ability to
detect time stretched attacks goes well beyond just the simple verification capabilities. Fur-
thermore, by examining the results it can be seen that the subnet attribute still provides sig-
nificantly important information even though the low efficiency factor is generating many
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noisy alerts. However, the increased amount of noise in the attack scenarios does appear
to have a slight effect on the services attribute which, in this case, functions better at a
higher granularity value than in most other cases. This result in comparison to the result
of the subnet attribute are in high contrast due to the fact that the subnet attribute still has
a defined path to follow and after the noise is handled by time windowing this path can
still be found. In the case of the services attribute, the noisy attacks will most likely create
inconsistencies in the histogram used to keep track of the popularity of attacks on a certain
service. Therefore, the resulting service values match with a low similarity and must use
a higher granularity to compensate for the increased difference. This was confirmed to be
the case by examining the similarity matrices produced by both of these attributes. The
entropy values for the protocol attribute, once again are significantly lower than for each of
the other attributes studied.
4.7 Results
Using the granularity values specified above, the LCS method was run and then entropy
values were determined for each of the attack scenario data sets created. The resulting data
is presented in Table 4.7.
As can easily be seen from the entropy results in Table 4.7, the protocol attribute con-
sistently provides a significantly lower value than the other three attributes in every attack
scenario tested. This shows directly that the progression of the protocol attribute’s tra-
jectory constantly contains the least amount of interesting information. Moreover, it was
determined that the other three attributes, alert severity, destination IP address, and services
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Severity Destination IP Services Protocol
Attacks Entropy Address Entropy Entropy Entropy
Scenario 1 0.8450 0.9148 0.9139 0.6459
Scenario 2 0.7218 0.8091 0.8392 0.5425
Scenario 3 0.8306 0.7010 0.8283 0.5933
Scenario 4 0.8475 0.7068 0.8575 0.5574
Scenario 5 0.8538 0.7187 0.8726 0.5353
Scenario 6 0.8241 0.7305 0.8513 0.5541
Scenario 7 0.6592 0.6650 0.8452 0.3509
Scenario 8 0.8026 0.7238 0.8541 0.6023
Table 4.7: Entropy results over multiple attack scenarios
attacked, provide meaningful and interesting data over all attack scenarios tested.
In the more extreme cases testing the effects of network topology and attack efficiency
revealed distinct characteristics about each attribute. Although the destination IP address
attribute performs well in most case, it does however suffer in a network where an in-
creased depth is present. Moreover, it can be said that the destination IP address attribute is
important and contains useful trajectory information as long as the network has an evenly
distributed network depth and breadth. Similarly, the services attribute can suffer when the
only a few or a single service is made available on network machines. This restricted path
will cause an artificially large number of positive matches to occur and will thus make the
services attribute less interesting. This becomes somewhat apparent in the increased depth
network where it is highly likely that a large number of the same service paths are used.
The decrease in the importance of this attribute is reflected in the lower entropy value found
in Table 4.5. The severity attribute performs well over all attacks and is therefore not only
the most interesting attribute but also the most robust of the attributes presented. Lastly, in
approximately all the cases presented, the protocol attribute consistently performed poorly.
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For this reason, it was determined that the protocol attribute is of little interest in terms of




Overall, this work was able to apply a subsequence matching method to cyber data in order
to discover similarities within attack trajectories. Furthermore, a measure of entropy was
used to quantify the importance of each of the attributes being examined. The combina-
tion of these two techniques allowed trajectory and sequence information to be taken into
account when performing dimensionality reduction. Additionally, qualitative and quantita-
tive analysis methods were used to determine the appropriate levels of division or resolution
and granularity for each of the attributes being considered. Using the network simulation
tool developed by Costantini, many other factors including network topology and attack
efficiency were thoroughly tested and analyzed.
This work has discovered and confirmed that the protocol attribute is the least important
and least meaningful of the alert attributes examined. Furthermore, analysis of multiple at-
tack scenario data sets has confirmed that the other three alert attributes examined, alert
severity, services attacked, and destination subnet attacked, are of significant importance in
terms of the progression of data contained within their corresponding trajectories. More-
over, it was discovered that a measure of entropy can be applied to the similarity matrix
resulting from an appropriate sequence comparison method to discover the most important
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alert attributes. In conclusion this work can accurately apply a dimensionality reduction
technique while still accounting for the order progression of an attack in the form of a
trajectory.
5.1 Future Work
In the future this method could be used with a system that has a large number of reliable
alert attributes for the reduction of data dimensionality in order to make cyber alert data
easier to examine. Furthermore, this method could easily be applied to other problem
domains in which trajectories or ordered data sequences of high dimensionality must be
considered. In particular, this method could be applied to the asymmetric warfare domain
to discover which strategic events are of the greatest importance.
Much future work can also be done to examine different resolutions of each attribute
but, will require a more powerful, robust, and inclusive simulation tool. Furthermore, a
larger number of alert attributes could be examined given that they are reliable enough.
The analysis of actual cyber alert data from existing networks could also be used to aid in
increasing the validity of results data.
Use of this work has already been applied to the hierarchical clustering method imple-
mented in thesis work done by Murphy [25]. The work done by Murphy seeks to use social
networking and hierarchical clustering concepts to perform clustering on network services
attacked over time. The LCS method from this thesis is being used to develop similar-
ity matrices for each of the alert attributes being examined. The hierarchical clustering
methods used by Murphy are the being applied to these matrices to obtain a better overall
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characterization of a cyber hacker’s actions on a network. Continual research is being per-
formed to investigate the merits of running this combination of algorithms in real-time for
the purpose of characterizing a cyber hacker’s capability. Additionally, this combination
of work could lead to a system which is able to provide a sufficiently accurate method of
predicting future alerts and cyber hacker actions.
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